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America’s Relation to World Order: Two Indictments, Two Thought Experiments, and a Misquotation

The State is undergoing a crisis of legitimacy owing to its
inability to cope with novel problems of weapons proliferation,
transnational threats including climate change, a fragile
global financial infrastructure, cultural influences carried by
electronic communications, and an undemocratic regime of
human rights law. These fatal inadequacies are summoning
forth a new constitutional order, the latest in a series of
century-spanning archetypal regimes that have arisen since
the Renaissance and the collapse of feudalism. A backlash
against the harbingers of this new order, however, is crippling
the development of those modes of action that are required
to deal with the underlying crisis. In the United States, this
crippling reaction has operated in tandem with a formidable
critique of America’s right to lead an international order that has
brought unprecedented prosperity and low levels of warfare to
the world. This backlash is as much a reaction to the critique
of the United States’ political and cultural heritage as it is
to the governing techniques that are harbingers of this new
constitutional order. Only a restoration of faith in America’s
constitutional and strategic heritage — its exceptional ethos
— will make possible the preservation of liberal traditions of
governing in the new world that is being born. To accomplish
this, we must answer the critiques by identifying what is the
animating American quality that entitles the United States to
compete for leadership.
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W

ithin states, the rise of populist,
illiberal movements in the
democracies of the West1 and the
increasing authoritarianism of
China2 at first appear to be unrelated developments.
In the West, governments are losing their prestige,
while the stature of China’s government has never
been higher. The condition of Russia’s autocracy,
meanwhile, continues to plunge. Its economy is
growing weakly, and for the fourth year in a row life
expectancy has declined. Yet the self-confidence
and public approval of the Russian regime appear
high. Surely these developments are so various
that they could not be related to one another.
Internationally, too, things seem to be moving
in different directions. For the first time since the
founding of the institutions of the current, postWorld War II order, a European state has invaded
a member of the United Nations and annexed its
territory.3 An East Asian state has relentlessly
developed nuclear weapons in defiance of U.N.
Security Council resolutions4 and has successfully
tested an intercontinental ballistic missile5 in
a campaign to expand its territory through the
reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast
to these centralizing acts of aggression, a leading

state has defected from the European Union6
and secessionist movements are active in several
other E.U. member states.7 To complicate matters,
the unity and cohesion of the North Atlantic
Alliance is in crisis.8 Surely these upheavals are
so contradictory that their causes could not be
similar.
Many thoughtful commentators have observed
that the apparent retrenchment of the liberal
world order is a consequence of developments in
the international system: the end of bipolarity,9 the
abandonment of Bretton Woods,10 the weakening
of U.N. Charter rules against intervention,11 the
rise of global terror groups,12 the upsurge in the
number of economic and political refugees,13 and
the novel policies of the Trump administration.14
These writers are not wrong, exactly, but they have
gotten the origins and dynamics of the breakdown
of the liberal world order wrong: It’s not that these
changes in the international order have prompted
reactions in the countries that have commenced
trade wars, weakened security alliances, and the
rest. Rather, it’s that changes in the constitutional
order of the constituent states of the international
system have led to decisions and actions that are
dismantling the world order that has been in place

1
E.g. the Front National in France (see James McAuley, “As France’s Far-Right National Front Rises, Memory of Its Past Fades,” Washington Post,
Jan. 26, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-frances-far-right-national-front-rises-memory-of-its-past-fades/2017/01/26/dfeb0d42e1ac-11e6-a419-eefe8eff0835_story.html), the M5S in Italy, the ÖVP and FPÖ in Austria (see Jon Henley, “Rise of Far-Right in Italy and Austria Gives
Putin Some Friends in the West,” Guardian, June 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/rise-of-far-right-in-italy-and-austriagives-putin-some-friends-in-the-west), and the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain (see Alex Hunt, “UKIP: The Story of the UK Independence
Party’s Rise,” BBC.com, Nov. 21, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073).
2 See Xi Jinping’s removal of presidential term limits (Steven Lee Myers, “With Xi’s Power Grab, China Joins New Era of Strongmen,” New York
Times, Feb. 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-authoritarianism.html) and China’s massive and invasive
domestic surveillance program (James A. Millward, “What It’s Like to Live in a Surveillance State,” New York Times, Feb. 3, 2017, https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-uighurs.html).
3 Steven Lee Myers and Ellen Barry, “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West,” New York Times, March 18, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html.
4 Alex Beuge et al., “A Guide to North Korea’s Advance Towards Nuclear Weapons,” Guardian, Nov. 29, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/sep/11/how-has-north-koreas-nuclear-programme-advanced-in-2017.
5 Josh Smith, “How North Korea’s Latest ICBM Test Stacks Up,” Reuters, Nov. 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missilestechnology-factbo/how-north-koreas-latest-icbm-test-stacks-up-idUSKBN1DT0IF.
6 Letter from U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May to E.U. President Donald Tusk, March 29, 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf.
7 Will Martin, “This Map Shows the European Regions Fighting to Achieve Independence,” Independent, Oct. 2, 2017, https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/politics/map-european-regions-fighting-for-independence-vote-europe-countries-state-a7979051.html.
8 See, among many commentators, Robert Kagan, “Things Will Not Be Okay,” Washington Post, July 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/everything-will-not-be-okay/2018/07/12/c5900550-85e9-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_story.html.
9 Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, eds., Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance (Brookings Institution
Press, 2010).
10 Richard Hurowitz, “What We Can Learn From Bretton Woods,” Weekly Standard, July 1, 2017, https://www.weeklystandard.com/richardhurowitz/what-we-can-learn-from-bretton-woods. See also G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1
(January 2018): 7–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241.
11 Jayshree Bajoria and Robert McMahon, “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2013, https://www.
cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention.
12 See, e.g., Janet Daley, “Islamic Terror Could Kill Off the West’s Liberal Values,” Telegraph, July 30, 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/07/30/islamist-terror-could-kill-off-the-liberal-values-of-the-liberal/.
13

“Figures at a Glance,” U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, June 19, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.

14 Kori Schake, “The Trump Doctrine Is Winning, and the World Is Losing,” New York Times, June 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/
opinion/sunday/trump-china-america-first.html.
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since 1949.15
All these developments are, in fact, related to
the deep change in the State that is underway.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the United
States, the leading industrial nation-state and
the chief architect and defender of the current
world order. It is no coincidence that the United
States is not alone in experiencing the traumatic
unsettling of its constitutional order, but it is
difficult to understand the steady weakening of the
international order without grasping first what is
happening within America.

I. American Exceptionalism
American exceptionalism is usually defined
as the rather preening claim that the United
States is uniquely virtuous or wise. This is the
inference doubtless intended by Ronald Reagan’s
speechwriter who bowdlerized John Winthrop’s
address to his fellow pilgrims about “a shining city
on a hill.”16 This is also probably what President
Barack Obama had in mind when he stated that
all countries are exceptional17 — that is, he didn’t
mean that they are all paragons but, rather, he
wanted to avoid offense by giving out a trophy to
every team member who showed up.
If the United States is exceptional, what is it an
exception to? “The exception provides the rule”
because it delimits the boundaries of the rule’s
application. To what rule does America’s exception
then provide a boundary?18 The most famous
remark in the study of the State and the exceptions
to its rules was made by Carl Schmitt, who wrote,
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”19
That, presumably, is because determining the
exception provides the limit of the application of
the rule and determining rules and their application
is the prerogative of the sovereign.
That brings us to the first step in the analysis
of “American exceptionalism.” By this hackneyed
phrase I do not mean what makes the United

States so much better than other states but rather
what makes America so American, as opposed to
Japanese or South African, and thus the answer
must be a cultural, contingent one. If it is true that
he who is sovereign determines what is exceptional,
then it is striking that it is the United States’
innovative ideas about sovereignty that define the
American state and what makes the United States
a constitutional outlier among states.
The U.S. Constitution reflects the idea that the
State is a limited sovereign: There are certain
inalienable powers that are reserved to the People
and cannot be delegated to the State. Therefore,
the State’s power rests on a compact with the
empowering people, a contract whose terms limit
the scope of the state’s potential as well as its
actual authority. As a rule of sovereignty, it might be
thought oxymoronic to proclaim a limited sovereign
that cannot determine the extent of its own powers.
Yet this is precisely what makes the government of
the United States exceptional: It cannot determine
the boundaries of its authority — these are set by
the U.S. Constitution — beyond recognizing that
there are some boundaries it cannot cross. This
explains the unusual powers given to lawyers and
courts in the American system: The rule of law is
not merely an instrument of the State but the basis
for determining its scope.
It is all too common to neglect this remarkably
innovative feature of the American state. Louis
Hartz, among others, once argued that American
constitutional ideas derived from those of John
Locke.20 For Locke,
equality is natural to human beings because
at a minimum all people own the same
property: their labor. Freedom is preferable
to authoritarianism because the best
governments are those that win the consent
of the people. Religious toleration is a good
idea because faiths that are free will be
stronger than those that are coerced.21

15 For a history of the constitutional orders of the modern state, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History
(New York: Knopf, 2001). Industrial nation-states first appeared in the last third of the 19th century and by the end of World War I had largely
supplanted the imperial state nations of the great powers that dominated the 19th century. We still live within this constitutional order, but
elements of its challenger, the informational market state, are already evident — for examples, see Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for
the Twenty-First Century (New York: Knopf, 2008) — and have provoked the backlash to which I refer. This essay is not about a new constitutional
order, nor is it principally about the backlash that is taking place in many societies. Rather it is about the role of the United States in managing this
transition in the face of powerful critiques of its past actions.
16

Ronald Reagan’s election-eve address, “A Vision for America,” Nov. 3, 1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85199.

17 “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek
exceptionalism,” Obama said in an April 4, 2009, news conference. White House transcript is available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009.
18 All persons born in the United States are eligible to serve as president, except those who would be younger than age 35 when inaugurated.
The exception provides the rule that one must be 35 years of age to be president.
19

Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 8th ed. (1934), ch. 113 (“Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet”).

20 See, generally, Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 2nd ed. (Wilmington, MA: Mariner Books, 1991).
21 Alan Wolfe, “Nobody Here but Us Liberals,” New York Times, July 3, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/books/review/nobodyhere-but-us-liberals.html.
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Well, not exactly. Precisely because all people
do not own the same property, or rather the
property they do own, their labor, has value that
varies enormously from person to person, from
time to time, from place to place, it is hard to
ground equality in the material endowments of
human beings. Rather, what made equality seem
“natural” in the Western liberal tradition is that
all peoples’ natures were held equally subject to
divine judgment, redemption, and salvation, a
concept that would be nonsensical if every person
were not endowed with the freedom of conscience,
on the basis of which he or she is to be judged.
One might say “all men are created equal because
they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights.” The equality enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence — a document that
provides the basis for the U.S. Constitution — is
said to be “self-evident,”22 the Creator of mankind
having determined that it is to be so.
Freedom is not preferable to authoritarianism
because the “best” governments win the consent
of the people. The term “best” is too vague
to support this assertion and can be easily
manipulated to prove the opposite proposition (as
it often has been). Rather, freedom is preferable to
authoritarianism because coercion is incompatible
with the exercise of the conscience, which is the
ultimate basis for constitutional decision-making
in America.
Religious toleration is a good idea not because
faiths that are free will be stronger than those that
are coerced. Much of the history of Christianity
and Islam seems to prove just the opposite. Rather,
religious toleration is preferable to intolerance
because intolerance suppresses the ability to
determine facts and also suppresses the faculties
of reflection and reconsideration, all of which are
essential attributes of the individual conscience if
it must make judgments for which it will be held
accountable.
A recent essay on the U.S. Constitution concluded,

anything else at the time and that were designed
to protect democracy by enabling it to defend
itself against imperial opponents and to keep it
from decaying into license and anarchy. Unlike the
laws in other states of the late 18th century, the
U.S. Constitution does not exempt aristocrats from
taxation. To observe that it has “nothing to do with
human rights” or equality reveals how little the
writer understands the complexity of his subject,
in which rights are often inferred from affirmative
grants of power — that is, when the rule provides
its exception.
Such assertions as the one I have quoted, which
would have been trite in Charles Beard’s day, are
today part of a more general war on the legacy of
America’s constitutional history. That war — and
that legacy — will be discussed presently. For now,
I will take up briefly just why the Constitution,
in fact, has everything to do with human rights
and equality. To do this will require going beyond
the customary claims that the historiography of
America’s founding pits liberalism and human
rights against republicanism and state power.
As I have suggested, the liberal, human rights
consensus in America regarding the constitutional
status of property rights, social mobility, individual
freedom, and popular democracy arose from shared
commitments to the decisive role of the conscience
in determining the individual’s fate. This might
more aptly be called the “Protestant ethic,”24 which
is incompatible with insecure property rights and
promises, rigid and inherited class boundaries, and
coercive rules that suppress individual expression.
It is similarly incompatible with the derivation of
legitimate governmental authority from traditions
and processes that privilege the few while denying
the many equality before the law.
In a review tracing the historiography of
America’s founding, Michael Millerman described
this founding as “Lockean Liberalism versus
Republicanism.” According to Millerman, Lockean
liberalism

Far from [being] a blueprint for democracy,
the Constitution kept real power away from
ordinary people while protecting wealthy
investors and slave-owners. It had nothing
to do with human rights or social equality.23

insists that America was founded on
principles that recognize an abstract, natural
right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit
of one’s private happiness. These natural
rights are liberties that define a private
sphere, to be protected from government
interference. By contrast, [some argue that]
Republicanism informed the Founders’
vision of what America is and should be.

In reality, the U.S. Constitution explicitly
provides a blueprint for democracy by creating
republican structures far more democratic than
22 Declaration of Independence, 1776, para. 2.

23 J.M. Opal, “America Should Never Be ‘Great Again,’” Time, April 5, 2017, http://time.com/4726868/donald-trump-america-great-again-myth/.
24 Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus [The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism] (1905).
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Republicanism elevates such notions
as, ‘the common good,’ and ‘the public
sphere’ above those of, ‘individual
liberties’ and, ‘private happiness.’
Indeed, it can justify infringing on
the latter for the sake of the former.
Hence it is in conflict with Lockean
liberalism.25
To anchor this in sacred American
texts, it is often claimed that the liberal
(Lockean) Declaration of Independence
conflicts
with
the
Republican
(Machiavellian) Constitution.26
This antinomy between liberalism and
republicanism may indeed be relevant
to British thought, where popular
sovereignty is fully vested in the State
and human rights are expressly granted,
as in the Magna Carta. But it gets wrong
the American constitutional settlement
and its most important element: that
the purpose of putting the State under law is to
protect human rights, and that the protection
of human rights requires that the State treat its
citizens equally. America’s peculiar constitutional
innovation is to create a partial sovereign, removing
from the State and irrevocably vesting in the People
the power to determine the exception to the rules
that govern the State. This constitutional structure
implies an infinite list of human rights — actions
that cannot be taken by the State — that can be
inferred from the limited grant of governmental
powers. A structure of enumerated powers, where
any power not permitted is prohibited, necessarily
implies a complement of unenumerated rights. This
means the republic enlists Americans’ energies
and its collective efforts and mutual obligations
on behalf of individual rights. America is neither
a conservative nor a liberal state but a state that
seeks to conserve a liberal tradition. This is the
American constitutional ethos.
To understand this, we must see the
Constitution as the embodiment, the instantiation,
of the Declaration of Independence. Like most law
students of my generation, I used to think that the
Declaration of Independence had no legal status
because it was not ratified like the Constitution. On
this, as in so many things, the late Charles Black
turned me around. I came to realize that the 1787
Constitution sought to create a state that was based

on the Declaration, a state structure that could
more perfectly execute the ideas of the Declaration
than could the Articles of Confederation. Thus, the
ratification of the Constitution also amounted to
the ratification of the Declaration, nunc pro tunc.
Indeed, this is why Abraham Lincoln alludes to
the Declaration of Independence (“Four score and
seven years ago”) when he makes the constitutional
argument to refute secession. This also explains
why the Declaration is a rich source for ethical
argument — one of the six fundamental modalities
of constitutional argument that collectively form
the standard model taught today in first-year law
classes27 — just as the Federalist Papers are an
abundant source for historical argument or the U.S.
Reports for doctrinal argument.
Ethical argument — the argument from the
American constitutional ethos — is sometimes
called “the argument from tradition.” This fits with
my thesis that it is a liberal, human rights tradition
that is conserved by the bulwarks and bastions, the
watchtowers, moats, and high walls of America’s
constitutional architecture. Indeed, you might say
that the oath “to preserve, protect, and defend” is
a pretty good metonym for “to fortify.”
The American constitutional ethos is the United
States’ unique paradigm of the liberal tradition
that flows from the Reformation and the decisive
role the liberal tradition gives to the individual

25 Michael Millerman, “The Historiography of America’s Founding: Lockean Liberalism versus Republicanism,” Telos, July 16, 2013, http://www.
telospress.com/the-historiography-of-americas-founding-lockean-liberalism-versus-republicanism/.
26 See, e.g., Luigi Marco Bassani, “The Bankruptcy of the Republican School,” Telos 124 (Summer 2002): 131–57.
27 See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1992). The six fundamental forms of constitutional argument — or “modalities”
of argument, as they are sometimes called — are: historical, textual, doctrinal, structural, prudential, and ethical.
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conscience. If this tradition is prefigured in the late
Renaissance28 and the early Reformation,29 then
one might say that communism, with its focus
on scientific orthodoxy and prediction, is a child
of the Enlightenment two centuries later and that
fascism, with its focus on the genetic basis for
nationalism and collective behavior, is a child (if
an illegitimate one) of Darwinian biology a century
after that. The materialism of both these legacies
is fundamentally incompatible with human
consciousness (as Thomas Nagel has recently
argued30) and thus with the role assigned to the
conscience by parliamentarianism.
The imperial state nations31 that dominated the
19th century were the first modern states to unite
the State and the nation. The industrial nationstates that came to dominate the 20th century also
fused the constitutional order with nationalism.
Thus, Americans whose state descends from a
late-18th-century founding tend to forget that
what is meant by a nation is a cultural, linguistic,
ethnic, religious, and historic group — not a state.
Indeed, there are some nations — like the Kurds,
the Palestinians, or the Cherokee — that don’t have
states. In the Bible, when Jonah’s fellow seafarers
asked him, “Of what nation are you?” they were
not inquiring about his citizenship.32 Americans
forget this because, in the United States, we make
precisely this inquiry. In America, it is citizenship
and not national origin that forms the basis for the
nation. This is one important divergence from the
constitutional traditions of Europe and one reason
why fascism has never had much of a toehold in
America.
Marxism and fascism embrace progress,
whether it be the progress of science or the steady
winnowing of the survival of the best adapted.
Both ideologies claim to rely on science and the
social sciences, which are themselves thought to
be indicia and drivers of progress.
The Anglo-American liberal tradition, by contrast,
embraces pluralism, the idea that we can never
be too sure of any orthodoxy and must perforce
tolerate dissent. It is skeptical of progress but
always open to incremental change. This ideology
has its roots in tolerance — that we conserve

competing values over time by giving them a
chance at their turn of Fortuna’s wheel. The liberal
tradition assumes that, at any one moment, one
not only can be wrong but, to some degree, almost
certainly is.
Certain progress, however, demands certainty.
Thus, Marxism and fascism were illiberal in the
sense that they wished to destroy the impediments
to progress, which, it was said, included dissent
and free debate. The liberal tradition not only had
different sources than its enemies in the Long
War that began in 1914 and ended in 1990 — it had
different constitutional methods and assumptions
as well.

II. The Outer Critique
This description of the American constitutional
ethos has lately been under attack, both as to its
outer manifestations abroad and its inner legacy
for the American people. These critics deny that
America’s values, political system, and history
— the American constitutional ethos — are
really unique and worthy of admiration. While
conceding that the United States possesses certain
exceptional traits — some dubious, it is said, like
gun ownership; some mystifying and inexplicable
(to their critics), like high levels of religiosity —
this critique asserts that U.S. action abroad has
nothing to do with this ethos. Instead, America’s
international history, like that of every other state,
has been determined primarily by power and the
competitive context of the international system.
This is the “outer” assault. (The “inner” assault will
be dealt with in the next section.) The indictment
has six counts.
First, it is said that while Americans claim they
are exceptional and indispensable — two different
points, by the way — many states and many
nations have made this claim. In fact, according
to one such critic, “Among great powers, thinking
you’re special is the norm, not the exception,”33 and
it is true that American “exceptionalism” is rarely
carefully defined beyond the most general and
anodyne terms.

28 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. Peter Bondanella (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Philip Bobbitt, The Garments of
Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World that He Made (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2013), 10, 16.
29 Martin Luther, Martin Luther’s 95 Theses (2008), ebook available at http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/274/pg274-images.html.
30 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 8, 13–16, 127–28.
31 My terminology for the constitutional order that achieved dominance in the 19th century; it sought popular allegiance on the grounds that the
State would exalt the nation by fusing it with the State. See Bobbitt, Shield of Achilles, 144–204; also Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, 26 et seq.
32 Jonah 1:8.
33 Stephen M. Walt, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-ofamerican-exceptionalism/.
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Second, although Americans like to think their
country behaves better than other states, and
certainly better than other great powers, this is
false. The United States has an expansionist history
that began with its conquest of the North American
continent. The Allied strategic bombing campaigns
in World War II killed 353,000 Germans,34 and
approximately 330,000 Japanese civilians were killed
by American bombs.35 The United States dropped
more than seven million tons of explosives during
the war in Indochina36 and should be held responsible
for the more than 600,000 civilian deaths in that
war.37 In the past three decades, U.S. military action
has been directly or indirectly responsible for the
deaths of 250,000 Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Balkans.38 U.S. drones tracking terrorists in at
least five countries have killed an unknown number
of innocent civilians.
Third, while the United States proclaims its
devotion to human rights and international law,
it has refused to sign most human rights treaties,
including the Ottawa Landmines Treaty,39 and is
not a party to the International Criminal Court.40
Nor has the United States energetically moved in
the direction of decommissioning its vast nuclear
arsenal, as it committed to do, in principle, when
it acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In
the face of such facts, how dare the United States
claim to be devoted to the rule of law.
Fourth, the United States has often made common
cause with some of the worst dictators and humanrights-abusing regimes. Nor has its own record been
without blemish: The abuse of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib and the Bush administration’s reliance on

torture and preventive detention are well-known.
President Obama’s decision to conduct drone
warfare without judicial warrants and even to wage
war with questionable congressional authority
suggests that such abuses are not a partisan or
unusual matter. How dare the United States claim
to be committed to human rights and due process.
Fifth, U.S. claims to have defeated aggression in the
20th century ring hollow when the history of 20thcentury conflicts is actually consulted. Although
Americans tend to congratulate themselves for
winning World War I, there are scholars who
think the U.S. entry into the war only once the
great European empires were thoroughly depleted
was really aimed at succeeding those empires as
the master of the international scene.41 Woodrow
Wilson may have proclaimed the war a fight to make
the world “safe for democracy,”42 but anyone can see
in retrospect — it is asserted — that it was really
the opening salvo in an effort to build an American
empire in Europe.
Critics also argue that, although Americans
similarly congratulate themselves for having won
World War II, most of the fighting was done in
Eastern Europe and the main burden of defeating
Hitler’s war machine was borne by the Soviet
Union.43 And while Americans also tend to think they
won the Cold War all by themselves, they ignore the
contributions of the courageous dissidents whose
resistance to communist rule produced the “velvet
revolutions” of 1989.44
Sixth, although President Bill Clinton said that the
United States was “indispensable to the forging of
stable political relations,”45 and his secretary of state,

34 Richard Overy, The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe, 1940–1945 (New York: Viking, 2014), 304–7.
35 Michael Tillman, Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942–1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 256.
36 Michael Clodfelter, Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1792–1991 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995), 225.
37 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 442–53.
38 I am by no means convinced of these figures, to say nothing of the blithe assumptions of “direct or indirect responsibility,” but they are a
customary feature of the critique and it would not change minds if the numbers were significantly less (even if more accurate).
39 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; see treaty status
information at http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-status.aspx.
40 For a summary of the U.S. policy toward the court per an Obama administration National Security Strategy, see: https://www.state.gov/j/gcj/
icc/.
41 See Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: Harper, 1980), 362; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and
the Men Who Made It (New York: Knopf, 1948), 266; and “Trials of the Great War 1914–2014: War and the American Century,” https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=E_hNqxTp3UI; Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power
(New York: New Press, 2006); Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003).
42 55 Cong. Rec. 1, 120 (1917).
43 Walt, “Myth of American Exceptionalism.” See also Ishaan Tharoor, “Don’t Forget How the Soviet Union Saved the World from Hitler,” Washington
Post, May 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-world-fromhitler/.
44 Walt, “Myth of American Exceptionalism.”
45 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, White House (July 1994), 5, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1994.pdf.
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Madeleine Albright, even referred to the United
States as “the indispensable nation,”46 we will soon
find out whether this is really true. Like the little
boy who finds himself at the head of a marching
band and thinks he is leading it through the streets,
should the little boy turn down an alleyway, the
band will go on without him. What states look to
the United States for moral and political leadership
today, critics ask? As Donald Tusk, the president
of the European Council, remarked, today America
doesn’t have “that many” friends.47
Thus runs what one may call the “outer critique”:
the exposé of the true history (it is said) of America’s
interaction with the international system. Now let
us engage these critiques, seriatim.
It may be best to concede that every society and
every state not only claims to be exceptional but is,
in fact, exceptional. However, they are exceptional
not in the way that Obama proclaimed: that every
state, like every child, is “exceptional.”48 Instead,

what makes a society exceptional is simply what
defines it in contrast to other societies. What makes
a Japanese or an Australian not a Frenchman or a
Ugandan is a function of his or her country and its
culture and history. What makes a state exceptional
is its unique constitutional ethos — the way it
deploys its sovereignty to achieve legitimacy in the
eyes of its people and territorial integrity in the face
of its adversaries. This account of exceptionalism
does not make the United States or any other
state uniquely virtuous or successful, although the
constitutional institutions that each state creates
will channel the virtue of its citizens and martyrs
and can accelerate its successes. It really does
not say much at all except that it is important to
determine the “nature of the exception” — how the
state determines who will decide the ambit of law.
In the case of the United States, this is its greatest
legacy — not the hamburger, not the Corvette, not
jazz or baseball — but the daring constitutional

46 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, interview by Matt Lauer, Today Show, NBC, Feb. 19, 1998, https://1997-2001.state.gov/
statements/1998/980219a.html.
47 Remarks by President Donald Tusk on E.U.-NATO cooperation, European Council, July 10, 2018, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2018/07/10/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-on-eu-nato-cooperation/.
48 Schake, “Trump Doctrine Is Winning.”
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innovation by which the State was put under law.
That America has sometimes failed to live up to
that legacy only means that it is fallible. Indeed,
the self-criticism that points out these flaws is
actually a necessary part of such a pluralist, yet
individualist, system.
Now let us try a thought experiment as we work
our way through the various charges of the “outer”
indictment against the United States. Let us
imagine the present as if the past simply omitted
the role of the United States in world affairs.
Such a thought experiment is merely a heuristic
device to overcome the Anachronistic Fallacy that
underlies so much of both the outer and inner
critiques of American behavior. That Fallacy occurs
when we transport our current context — not just
its technology and wealth but its attitudes and
mores — to earlier periods. Why, for example,
didn’t earlier societies treat infectious diseases
more successfully? Koch’s postulates weren’t
“discovered”; they were formulated using ideas that
had been present in many cultures for centuries.
Should we reproach our ancestors for not having
figured this out earlier? Or must we concede that
without something like these postulates, the
causal connection between disease and germs isn’t
apparent? The Anachronistic Fallacy enshrines
itself in an attitude that everything about the
present can be held fixed and imported into the
past even though the present is a result of the
past.49
It is true that by purchasing the Louisiana
Territory from France and by pacifying lands
through countless aggressions and defensive
battles against the native population of the
continent, the United States created an empire
on our island continent. It is also true that along
with these strategic accessions, including those of
the Mexican War, the United States brought the
American political culture westward. Would the
West and Southwest have been better off today
if California and Texas had remained under a
European emperor like Napoleon or the Mexican

dictator Santa Ana, even if we assume that his
attitude toward slavery was preferable? Even if
we concede that the life of the Native Americans
was better before their defeat, despite their own
internecine campaigns of ethnic cleansing against
each other,50 would this way of life have prevailed
against the Spanish conquistadors? It didn’t in
South America, where the native populations were
better armed and organized to resist invasion than
their northern counterparts. Have those states
fared better with the legacy of Iberian colonial
culture? Has the rule of law prospered as a guiding
principle in politics even at the hortatory level? I
am aware of the critique that American meddling
and exploitation in Latin America have given rise
to a structure of plunder that is responsible for
the chronic poverty and underdevelopment there.
Without addressing the economic merits of this
description — which is sometimes reduced to
“We’re poor; it’s their fault”51 — does it lead to the
conclusion that the U.S. presence in the hemisphere
prevented its liberal practices and traditions from
flourishing in Latin America? Those revolutionary
leaders who expelled the European colonialists in
the early 19th century felt otherwise.52
The strategic bombing campaigns against
Germany and Japan had elements that today
one might think of as war crimes — the pitiless
attacks against urban populations, for example.
But those campaigns, fought with less precision
and with cruder aerial weapons than are now
deployed, played a crucial role in the defeat of
the fascist dictatorships. Would those wars have
been won without the Americans (and without
their sometimes ruthless tactics)? If it is true, as
I believe, that the atomic weapons used against
Japan discredited Japanese fascism in the eyes of
its own people, what would have been the outcome
had there been no Manhattan Project? Besides the
United States, only Germany had the technology,
organized technocracy, and wealth to create
nuclear weapons during World War II — suppose it
had? If the Americans had not fought in the Pacific,

49 Note, this is not the same as saying we must not judge an earlier society by our current moral, political, and aesthetic values; as I remark later
in the essay, “Who else’s judgments would we apply,” the consciousnesses of earlier cultures being so inaccessible to us.
50 See Jeffrey P. Blick, “The Iroquois Practice of Genocidal Warfare (1534–1787),” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 3 (2001): 405–29, https://
doi.org/10.1080/14623520120097215.
51 “Author Changes His Mind on ’70s Manifesto,” New York Times, May 23, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/books/eduardo-galeanodisavows-his-book-the-open-veins.html.
52 See Simón Bolívar’s Letter from Jamaica, Sept. 6, 1815. “As long as our countrymen do not acquire the abilities and political virtues that
distinguish our brothers of the north, wholly popular systems, far from working to our advantage, will, I greatly fear, bring about our downfall. …
Although I seek perfection for the government of my country, I cannot persuade myself that the New World can, at the moment, be organized as
a great republic. Since it is impossible, I dare not desire it; yet much less do I desire to have all America a monarchy because this plan is not only
impracticable but also impossible. Wrongs now existing could not be righted, and our emancipation would be fruitless. The American states need
the care of paternal governments to heal the sores and wounds of despotism and war.” Selected Writings of Bolivar, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New
York: Colonial Press, 1951). Accessed via Brown University Center for Digital Scholarship: https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/
chapters/chapter-2-the-colonial-foundations/primary-documents-with-accompanying-discussion-questions/document-2-simon-bolivar-letter-fromjamaica-september-6-1815/.
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would China and Korea have been liberated? If
so, by whom? It is worth recalling that the Soviet
Union did not even declare war against Japan until
the Americans had used the atomic bomb against
Hiroshima.53
The U.S. mission in Vietnam did not achieve
its war aim of preserving the South Vietnamese
regime, but it did buy time for the other states in
the region. No less an authority than Lee Kuan
Yew54 stated many times that without the U.S.
effort in Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand, and perhaps even the Philippines would
have become communist states.55 His point is that
the widely assumed discrediting of the “domino
theory” only possesses a superficial credence
because the United States did in fact intervene
in Southeast Asia. The American occupation of
Iraq was a fiasco, but can it really be assumed
that the world would be safer today if Saddam
Hussein and his psychopathic dynasty were still
in power in Baghdad? Based on the testimony of
his own scientists, Saddam planned to seek nuclear
weapons at the earliest possible moment after
sanctions were loosened56 — sanctions that were
themselves unraveling before the U.S. invasion.57 Is
it even conceivable that there would have been an
agreement with Iran to cease production of nuclear
weapons if Saddam were still in power? With
respect to the suffering of the Iraqi people that
the invasion and its aftermath brought, it seems
highly relevant that, however much they rightly
condemn the U.S.-led coalition’s failures during the
occupation, a large majority of Iraqis, when polled
in the early months of the occupation, supported
the coalition’s invasion and removal of Saddam,
saying it was “worth it.”58
U.S. drones and special operations forces do
inadvertently kill civilians. But are the number of
civilian casualties not dramatically reduced by using
drones and special forces instead of high-altitude

bombing?59 Is it true that countries that suffer from
terrorist attacks, countries that implore the United
States to aid their armed struggles, would be
better off if America ceased trying to cripple those
malevolent and savage terror networks? Would
there be fewer Muslim deaths if the Islamic State
still reigned over much of Iraq and Syria? Is Syria
today better off because the United States chose
not to intervene in force?
What about the claim that the United States is
hypocritical in its promotion of human rights and
international law? It is true that America, along with
other democracies, has refused to sign a number
of human rights treaties that have been signed by
dictators. However, scholars have persuasively
argued that this is because the United States
actually enforces those treaties in its domestic
courts and therefore has to be very careful about
its commitments.60 Dictators, on the other hand,
can sign whatever they please, knowing that such
treaties amount to nothing but scraps of paper in
their judicial systems. Is it really the case that the
cause of human rights around the world would
be further advanced today without the American
efforts that fostered these rights? Without
the Helsinki Accords?61 Without the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
Landmines are useful in military defense because
they persist — that is, they do not fail when a
tactical position is lost, and they do not require
the presence of troops to maintain a position in
order to give fire. This is also why landmines pose
a humanitarian problem. Long after the battle
is over, they continue to explode when innocent
civilians set them off. As a matter of technology,
however, this does not have to be the case. Timing
mechanisms can be used that cause landmines to
deactivate within as little as a few hours or as long
as 30 days, which is the maximum allowed under the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to

53 Though violent clashes had occurred in 1939 between the two powers.
54 First prime minister of Singapore and leader of the People’s Action Party that campaigned for Singapore’s independence from Britain.
55 See, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000 (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 467, 573.
56 See statement by David Kay on the interim progress report on the activities of the Iraq Survey Group, hearing before the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, House Appropriations Committee’s subcommittee on defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Oct. 2, 2003, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2003/david_kay_10022003.html.
57 David Rieff, “Were Sanctions Right?” New York Times, July 27, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.
html.
58 Richard Burkholder, “Gallup Poll of Iraq: Liberated, Occupied, or in Limbo?” Gallup, April 28, 2004, https://news.gallup.com/poll/11527/galluppoll-iraq-liberated-occupied-limbo.aspx.
59 Daniel L. Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Brookings Institution, June 17, 2013, https://www.
brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/.
60 See Oona A. Hathaway, “Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,” University of Chicago Law Review 72 (2005):
469, 499. “States that are more likely to engage in domestic enforcement of the terms of international legal agreements are therefore less likely to
commit to them in the first place, all other things held equal.”
61

See Michael Cotey Morgan, The Final Act (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
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which the United States is a party.62 By contrast, the
Ottawa Convention of 1997, the Landmines Treaty,
to which the United States is not a party, bans only
anti-personnel mines and freely permits all types
of anti-vehicular mines.63 Yet few members of the
public seem to realize that anti-vehicular mines
can be every bit as dangerous to civilians as antipersonnel mines. Indeed, persistent anti-vehicular
mines kill innocent civilians trying to use roads,
thus preventing refugees from returning to their
homes and keeping humanitarian assistance from
reaching them. The public seems to be generally
unaware that this treaty bans only one class of
explosives or that the U.S. policy of deploying
time-sensitive mines — mines that effectively turn
themselves off — would do far more to reduce
civilian casualties if it were universally adopted.
In any case, it has been U.S. policy not to use any
persistent landmines since 2010 and this policy
covers all mines, those that target persons as well
as vehicles.64
But why doesn’t the United States simply cease
using landmines? To do so would mean removing
mines from the 38th parallel that separates North
from South Korea — virtually the only place where
the United States currently deploys mines. It is
a no man’s land where a highly dangerous and
unpredictable regime has more than one million
active soldiers in its military, with 70 percent of its
ground forces positioned south of the PyongyangWonsan line, most less than 100 miles from Seoul.65
Without mines, no realistic conventional force
could protect South Korea’s capital — which is less
than 35 miles from the Demilitarized Zone — from
a surprise attack by North Korean forces. Would
it really be a step toward peace on the peninsula
to remove this barrier? Suppose the United States
stopped trying to defend South Korea. Would the
Canadians and Swedes, who have been the most
critical of the American deployment of landmines,
be willing to take up these responsibilities with their
own forces? Would South Korea long be content
to remain a nonnuclear power when it becomes
clear, as it will, that North Korea’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons has been in service of that state’s
aggrandizement? Would Japan? Surely the resulting

nuclear proliferation to these states would not
bring about a safer and more humane world.
What about the International Criminal Court?
What is America afraid of? That it would lose its
impunity to commit war crimes? In the first place,
it is important to remember that even if the United
States were a party to the treaty that created the
International Criminal Court, the jurisdiction of that
tribunal would engage only when the United States
fails to prosecute its war criminals. Yet, in 2005,
U.S. military tribunals handed down stiff sentences
to prison guards who abused Iraqi prisoners.66 Of
course, there is more to it than that. In fact, the

U.S. government fears prosecutions by the court
— unlike those prosecutions that are authorized
and instructed by the U.N. Security Council, whose
tribunals the United States supports — because it
fears these would tip the balance against American
intervention in marginal theaters, eroding the
already vanishing public support in America for
humanitarian intervention. Today, the world order
depends upon American soldiers to protect human
rights in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and many
other places. The spectacle of U.S. soldiers being
tried before a foreign tribunal for acts committed
while in the service of such interventions should
give pause to anyone who wishes to persuade
Washington to undertake those missions. It is
difficult enough to muster public and congressional
support for such deployments. The tragedies in
Somalia, for example, led directly to the horrors
in Rwanda because once American soldiers had
been murdered and mutilated in Mogadishu there

62 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons; see Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, Technical Annex 3(a).
63 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Art. 1, §
1(a).
64 For more on U.S. policy on landmines, see: https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm.
65 Dave Majumdar, “North Korea’s Army by the Numbers: 4,300 Tanks and 200,000 Lethal Special Forces,” National Interest, Feb. 1, 2018, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/north-koreas-army-by-the-numbers-4300-tanks-200000-lethal-24301.
66 See, for example, “Graner Gets 10 Years for Abu Ghraib Abuse,” Associated Press, Jan. 16, 2005, https://web.archive.org/
web/20121231082819/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6795956; “Harman Found Guilty for Abu Ghraib,” Army News Service, May 19, 2005, https://
web.archive.org/web/20071123112051/http://www4.army.mil/news/article.php?story=7348; “Two More Soldiers Sentenced for Abu Ghraib Abuse,”
Army News Service, Feb. 10, 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20050915220948/http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=6843.
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was no political will to engage them again in an
African humanitarian mission. U.S. missions only
make things worse, it is often said. So, suppose
the Americans didn’t go abroad. Consider what life
would be like now in the Balkans.
When President Lyndon B. Johnson overruled
the unanimous opinion of his advisers to press
for the creation of the NPT regime, he may well
have hoped that someday the world would be rid
of nuclear weapons. This hope is enshrined in the
treaty. But would the world be safer — would there
be fewer states with nuclear weapons — if the
American nuclear deterrent that protects so many
other states was withdrawn? For technological and
economic reasons, the United States may be the
one nuclear power that could dispense with its
nuclear arsenal. If it did, would the net number of
nuclear powers actually decrease in the frenzy of
rearmament that would ensue?
The fourth charge of this “outer” indictment
implies that war crimes, torture, and extrajudicial
killings are as American as apple pie. Many states
have resorted to torture — Britain in Ireland,
France in Algeria, Israel in Palestine — and often
on a scale considerably greater than the American
abuses. It seems worth noting that the U.S. abuses,
at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo for example, were
not exposed simply by intrepid journalists and
litigators but by the U.S. Armed Forces themselves.
The point isn’t that the American constitutional
ethos ensures that the United States will not
commit terrible wrongs but that it makes it possible
— indeed depends upon — the United States
owning up to its errors and attempting to avoid
their repetition. In fact, a nuanced and accurate
assessment of American action, when it succeeds
in upholding the professed values of its ethos as
well as when it fails, is both consistent with our
constitutional principles and a necessary guide to a
stronger footing in establishing a global order that
reflects those values.
The charge that drone warfare amounts to
extrajudicial killing not only misunderstands
changes underway in the nature of warfare,67 it

also fails to comprehend the constitutional system
by which actors other than courts play a role in
waging wars and in ensuring their lawfulness.
Addressing the fifth charge that the United
States entered World War I to further its economic
interests and to provide the basis for an American
imperial role in Europe, it is hard to credit that
anyone familiar with Wilson’s policies truly
believes him to have been seeking such a role in
Europe (or anywhere else). The suggestion is not
only ahistorical, it is laughable. The principle of
self-determination with which Wilson is most
prominently associated is anathema to the very
concept of empire, as the empires that began World
War I discovered for themselves.
Nor is it germane to the question of the American
contribution to the defeat of the Nazis in World
War II to observe that the great sufferings and
sacrifices of the Soviet Union are also responsible
for the defeat of Germany. Again, consider a
counterfactual: Is there a military strategist or
historian alive who believes the Soviet Union
could have successfully resisted Germany without
American aid, without a second front, and without
American strategic bombing? Aerial bombing of
German cities forced Germany to move its fighter
aircraft away from the Russian front, giving Soviet
arms air superiority. Perhaps equally important,
Germany was compelled to move its 88mm antiaircraft guns back to Germany when these were the
most effective anti-tank weapons against Russian
forces.68
As for the Cold War, the United States, of
course, did not win it alone. Far from it. Indeed,
U.S. strategy was to build alliances so that it
could win with the help of others. But rather
than solicit the opinion of critics who decried the
American policy of containment at the time, why
not ask the dissidents themselves in the states
that were liberated? Do they believe that without
the American presence in Germany the Berlin Wall
would have come crashing down? Why not ask
Angela Merkel, who grew up in East Germany?69
Finally, although it may seem hubristic to cast

67 See Philip Bobbitt, “The ACLU Goes to War,” Just Security, Nov. 25, 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/34885/aclu-war/.
68 See Antony Beevor, “Freedom Sweeps Europe — But at What Cost?” Guardian, Sept. 10, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/
sep/10/second-world-war-liberation-europe; see also Antony Beevor: “Hitler’s anger with Goering over the Luftwaffe’s inability to stop Allied
bombers getting through, forced Nazi Germany to withdraw the bulk of its fighter squadrons and its 88mm anti-aircraft guns from the eastern
front to defend the Reich. By 1944, there were just 1,200 heavy anti-aircraft guns left for the whole of the eastern front, yet more than 7,000
back in Germany. And if these 88mm anti-aircraft guns, which were also the most devastating anti-tank weapons of the whole war, had not been
withdrawn from the eastern front, even more Soviet soldiers would have died. But the most decisive contribution to the outcome of the war was
the withdrawal of Luftwaffe fighter formations from the eastern front to defend German cities. This gradually tipped the balance of air superiority
on the eastern front away from the Luftwaffe, to such a degree that by 1944, it could hardly send any reconnaissance flights over Soviet lines.
This allowed the Red Army to prepare the huge deceptions which culminated in Operation Bagration, the destruction of Army Group Centre in
Belorussia, the most devastating victory of the whole war.” Antony Beevor, email message to the author.
69 Werner Reutter, “Who’s Afraid of Angela Merkel? The Life, Political Career, and Future of the New German Chancellor,” International Journal 61,
no. 1 (2005/2006): 214, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40204139.
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the United States as “the indispensable nation,”70
to use this claim as a slur raises many questions.
For example, indispensable to what? I’ve tried to
give a number of examples in which American
participation abroad, often in the face of powerful
domestic opposition, has proved a decisive
force for good. But perhaps the more important
question today is, if not the United States — if
not U.S. leadership of the world order that was
established with America’s allies after World War
II — then to which state should that leadership
be committed? To the European Union? To China?
To Russia and Iran? To a deadlocked U.N. Security
Council? Perhaps the proffered answer is that
there should be no leader, that the world we seek
should be multipolar. Well, that has been tried. The
multipolar world brought us both World War I and
World War II. No single state was powerful enough
to prevent either of those conflicts. Is it just a
coincidence that the number of wars in the world,
and the number of deaths both of soldiers and
civilians, has dramatically declined since America
took up its role as leader of the Alliance?

III. The Inner Critique
This essay began by discussing the subject
of constitutional law and now has strayed into
strategy. Such is the stuff of the “outer critique”
because it claims that America’s diplomatic and
strategic initiatives have been a sham, that it’s
just old-fashioned rent-seeking, in contrast to
the inspiring claims made by the architects of
the current world order. Thus, it should not
surprise anyone that the “inner critique” focuses
on discrediting the heroic myths of America’s
own history. For law, strategy, and history are
intertwined in a way that the separated academic
disciplines tend to obscure. As disciplines, each
has its own understanding of causal dynamics,
and practitioners are loath to increase, rather
than reduce, the multiplicity of causal accounts by
suggesting that some factor outside their own field
is at work. Within each subject — law, strategy, and
history — academics and analysts expect economic
or political or perhaps sociological causes to
account for developments. They are unlikely to
see any necessary relations among these three
classical ideas themselves. They do not appear to
depend upon each other.

Historians record how events in one arena can
affect events in another. A war is won, and the
peace conference that ends the war writes the
ensuing international law in the victor’s terms. Or
a war is lost, and a new constitutional structure
is imposed. The first happened after World War
II in San Francisco;71 the second, at about the
same time, in Tokyo.72 Thus, the outcomes of
strategy change law — and it becomes history.
Or, a revolution changes the constitutional order
of a state, replacing the aristocratic armies of the
18th-century territorial state with the mass armies
of conscripts of the imperial state nation, enabling
Napoleon to conquer Europe. Thus, constitutional
law shapes strategy, and this too is called history.
Or, new developments come into play — a new
religion drives migration across a continent or
technological innovation creates a mobile cannon
— and an empire falls, and with its strategic
collapse, its laws also die.
While such examples are familiar, we are inclined
to see their inter-relationship — the relationship
among law, strategy, and history — as the byproduct
of cause and effect, the result of developments of
which history is simply the record. But history is not
brought into being by context, whether strategic
or legal. History brings context into being. And as
this context unfolds, strategy and law are made
manifest in events. It is therefore hardly surprising
that the “inner critique” would be an attack on the
American perception of its own history.
For law and strategy are not merely made
in history — a sequence of events and
culminating effects — they are made of
history. It is the self-portrayal of a society
that enables it to have an identity. Without
this self-portrayal, this identity, a society
cannot establish its rule by law because every
system of laws depends upon the continuity
of legitimacy, which is an attribute of identity.
Furthermore, without such a self-portrayal,
no society can pursue a rational strategy
because it is the identity of the society that
strategy seeks to promote, protect, and
preserve. One might say that without its own
history, its self-understanding, no society
can have either law or strategy, because it
cannot be constituted as an independent
political entity.73

70 See footnote 31.
71

Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169.

72 Surrender by Japan, Terms Between the United States of America and the Other Allied Powers and Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, U.S.–Japan, 59 Stat.
1733.
73 See Bobbitt, Shield of Achilles, 5–6.
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The view of American history that forms the
basis for the “inner critique” claims that the U.S.
national narrative is born in original sin, three sins,
actually: slavery, the theft of land, and genocide.
On this telling of the American story, the United
States has grown powerful owing to monstrous
crimes. That history cannot provide Americans
with a common morality, or common heroes, or a
common etiquette where national symbols, like the
American flag or an unsingable national anthem,
are concerned because to make common cause
with these cultural artifacts is to drink the draughts
that have poisoned U.S. history from the founding.
This account has significant implications for world
order and for the U.S. defense of that order.
Indeed, the connection between the inner and
outer critiques now becomes clear: They are a
combined effort to dismantle the foundation
of America’s international behavior, which is
America’s confidence in the constitutional ethos
that makes the United States exceptional. As the
writer I quoted at the outset of this essay put it,
The American myth is at a crossroads. Our
old stories will not save us. We need a new
way to understand ourselves … Our new story
would admit that much of our democracy
has grown despite the rules and myths of
the Founders and the frontier, not because
of them. Freed of those rules and myths … we
would be less eager to use our war machine
and to spend so much of our wealth upon it.
More aware of our own sins, we would feel
less driven to avenge them abroad.74
One seldom sees such a frank admission of the
synergy of outer and inner critique. And it’s not
hard to see the sort of constitutional rules the
author has in mind. At one point in his essay,
he complains that the Constitution forbids
legislatures from abrogating private contracts
as if this was a telling exposé of the class bias
of the Constitution’s ratifiers (very few of whom
were creditors) and not in fact a rule that actually
protects the availability and lowers the costs
of credit in a developing economy. In any case,
this is hardly what is exceptional about the U.S.
Constitution. What made the Constitution unique
among modern states is the decisive role it gives

to law and, in constitutional law, to the individual
conscience. It is true that the Constitution forbids
the federal and state governments from coercing
the press or establishing religious orthodoxy,
including requiring a religious test for office; that
it protects free speech and requires the equal
protection of the laws for all persons — not just
citizens — and insists on due process in the
application of its rules. The constitutions of many
countries do these things. More importantly,
America’s Constitution limits the scope as well as
the application of state power. It does not allow
the State to determine where its citizens shall live,
whom they shall marry, how many children a family
can have, or what profession or trade to pursue
not through the granting of rights but through
the withholding of power. It does not define the
“nation” as an ethnic or religious or racial group
but as a body of citizens. It does not enshrine a
popular democracy with the power to oppress
by means of the law but, instead, aims to protect
democracy with complicated structures — like the
protection of civil contracts, including marriage75
— that safeguard human rights. By these means it
seeks to transmute deadly political questions into
legal ones.
The original, unamended Constitution was
written in the context of a particular way of life
that was shared by the European societies that
had colonized the Americas. That worldview was
patriarchal, racist, and imperialistic, and America
lives with its consequences and, for some few,
even its ideology — although that worldview is no
longer widely held in those countries. The ThreeFifths Compromise, for example, is often cited as
a constitutional concession to the Southern states
that allowed for counting slaves in determining
the census, which was the basis for representation
in the House of Representatives.76 But it is also
true that this provision, similar to the decision to
count children and women in the census, aligns
with the idea that a male head of family represents
the household — including any slaves who lived
there. That slaves were counted only as threefifths of a person was resented and objected to by
white Southerners,77 only 5 percent of whom ever
owned a slave. Indeed, this figure underscores the
conclusion that racism and patriarchy, rather than
mere slavery, were at the heart of the dispute that

74 Schmitt, Politische Theologie (emphasis added).
75 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/osg/briefs/2012/01/01/2012-0307.mer.aa.pdf.
76 See Paul Finkelman, “How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War,” Rutgers Law Journal 43, no. 3 (2013): 405, https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243060.
77 South Carolina and Georgia both voted for a proposal to count slaves “as equal to Whites in the apportionment of Representation.” See
Madison Debates, “Wednesday, July 11, 1787,” Yale Law School Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_711.asp.
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divided the Union: Perhaps as many as a third of
white Southerners were members of households
that owned slaves and thus subordinated them
regardless of ownership..78 This does not exonerate
that generation but simply gives a clearer
description of the cultural basis for American
constitutional practices. A Constitution cannot be
better than its people, but it can provide for the
ways in which the People can change because
their values are not only reflected in law, they are
shaped by it.
Bear in mind that, in the 18th century,
when the original constitution was drafted,
most of the world’s slaves were owned by
Europeans, Africans, and Ottoman Muslims.
Many more slaves were brought through
the trans-Atlantic slave trade to European
colonies elsewhere (especially Brazil) than to
North America.79 Slavery itself — the conquest of
captives who were sold into bondage and traded
like chattel — was an ancient practice that thrived
in many countries and in the empires of native
peoples in the Americas. American and British
opinion that despised slavery was a notable
advance. What made American slavery so odious,
however, and has left such a pernicious legacy was
the racial element in American slavery, a result
of 18th-century globalization and the slave trade
with Africa, something that was deplored in the
Declaration of Independence. There was no room
in such an institution for an Epictetus. Thus, even
freedmen were held by the U.S. Supreme Court to
be ineligible for citizenship because race came to
determine rights.80 Yet in other ways, the United
States appeared more progressive than its peer
countries at the time, for instance, in imposing no
property ownership requirement to vote in federal
elections.81 It required an internal war, the most
costly in American lives of all U.S. wars combined,
to correct this terrible and degrading defilement,
but correct it the Americans did.
Would the American continent have remained
unsettled by Europeans if the Anglo-Dutch colonies
had never been established? Even assuming
harmony among Native American tribes, such an
assumption seems uninformed. Is it reasonable

to suppose that the other powers that coveted
an American empire for themselves would have
forborne the conquest of land from the Native
Americans they found here? Or that slavery would
not have come to the continent when those powers
arrived with their own customs and practices?
Were those countries less patriarchal, racist, and
imperialist than Britain and the Netherlands?
Was that the lesson of the French in Haiti or the
Spanish in Latin America? And what exactly does
“land theft” mean for states for whom conquest

was legitimate under the law of nations, and for
those native tribes whose nomadic practices defied
the conventional concept of land ownership?
Let me be clear: My plea for historical realism
cannot excuse slavery or genocide, acts that have
been condemned for millennia. It cannot condone
Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s or President Andrew
Jackson’s racist policies. But it might give us a fuller
picture of the intentions of Gen. Robert E. Lee, who
detested slavery but shrank from the civil war he
believed would attend immediate abolition,82 and
President Sam Houston, who was a protégé and
supporter of Jackson’s but who was adopted by
the Cherokee and fought to expose the behavior of
government agents against them..83
For the purposes of this essay, the question is not
whether America’s history is pristine but whether
that history would have been better in some other
country’s hands and, given how history unfolded,
what efforts America has made to overcome its
negative legacies because that overcoming is an

78 Information from the 1860 Census is available at http://www.civil-war.net/pages/1860_census.html.
79 See Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database estimates here: http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates.
80 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
81

Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2012), 66–67.

82 “In this enlightened age, there are few I believe, but what will acknowledge that slavery as an institution, is a moral & political evil in any
Country.” Robert E. Lee, Dec. 27, 1856. See: http://fair-use.org/robert-e-lee/letter-to-his-wife-on-slavery.
83 In 1830, Houston began representing the Cherokee nation and other Native American tribes in Washington. See his absorbing series of articles
for the Arkansas Gazette defending Native American rights and exposing the exploitation of Native Americans by U.S. officials. Jack Gregory and
Rennard Strickland, Sam Houston with the Cherokee, 1829–1833 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967); Amelia Williams and Eugene C. Barker, The
Writings of Sam Houston, 1813–1863 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1938).
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essential element in the ethos I have described
above.
If a people lose confidence in or despise or become
disgusted by their history, it will result in their
national enervation. It is evident that that is what the
writer quoted above and many other critics of U.S.
national security policy want. Perhaps this might be
wise in some instances. You may want an aggressive
society enervated, as the Germans and Japanese
were after World War II. But a world order cannot
be led or protected by a psychologically enfeebled
society. With its allies, the United States created the
current world order — the Charter of the United
Nations, the Bretton Woods international financial
system, the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The
United States did not act alone and could never have
succeeded by trying to impose a post-war order. The
United States sought, by benefiting others, to secure
itself. Thus, the enervation of the United States can
be costly to many states and is not just a matter of
one actor sitting out the dance.
That is why the criticism that U.S. policy has
been self-serving is so beside the point. Of course
U.S. policy was self-serving; it would have been
unsustainable otherwise. U.S. leadership attempted
to serve American interests, however, by embedding
the interests of other states in the United States’
calculus of costs and benefits.
Such leadership imposes costs that will not
be willingly borne by a society that believes its
principal legacy is shame. In fact, such a society will
turn inward toward the accumulation of material
advantage because this is the surest means by
which it can reassert its self-respect. Because of its
pessimism and self-loathing, it will come to resent
other states and hold them in contempt as the only
way of salvaging its own history.
With its allies, America has created and led the
current world order because it has been strategically
successful — it is rich and powerful — and because
it has put that leadership in service of democratic
and humane principles — the source of its reliance
on law. To give an unrealistic and fanciful account
of America’s history — for the fancy of some of its

critics reflects their resentments and obsessions as
fancies do — is to deny the true sources of that order
to undermine it. And because strategy and law are
made of history, this process works both ways: If the
critiques are historically uninformed and naïve, then
the defenses must take care not to degenerate into
cheerleading,84 but must be historically well-formed
and sophisticated enough to avoid anachronism.
This is not simply a matter of research; it also
requires imagination, for most peoples in the late
20th and early 21st centuries have been spared and
can scarcely imagine the atrocities that would have
befallen them without U.S. leadership.85
This is not to say — I emphasize — that American
history is unblemished, or a more morally admirable
one than that of other societies. Far from airbrushing
the past, America must take its historic wrongs —
for example, against African Americans and Native
Americans at home and against Southeast Asians
and Filipinos abroad — and study them to create
a future that is more humane and more inclusive.
When it functions as it was designed to work, the
operation of the American constitutional ethos
requires criticism, debate, and decisions according
to conscience.

IV. Disillusion Leads to Dissolution
Unfortunately, the loss of common ground — even
the willingness to engage in debate and discussion
with those with whom one disagrees — can be
facilitated by the decentralized U.S. constitutional
system with as-yet uncalculated consequences.
Thoughtful analysts such as the liberal James
Fallows86 and the conservative David Brooks87 have
celebrated the regeneration of the United States
through the renewal of localities. While there are
many inspiring stories — and not just in the United
States,88 because the devolutionary change in the
constitutional order I have described elsewhere89 is
not limited to America — there are also grounds for
concern about the “new localism.”90
Fission is what happens when the nucleus of
a large atom splits into smaller nuclei. When an

84 An observation urged on me by my research assistant Andrew Elliott.
85 I am indebted to my research assistant Philippe Schiff for this point.
86 James Fallows and Deborah Fallows, Our Towns: A 100,000-Mile Journey into the Heart of America (New York: Pantheon, 2018).
87 David Brooks, “The American Renaissance Is Already Happening,” New York Times, May 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/opinion/
the-american-renaissance-is-already-happening.html.
88 “This trend is accelerating and moving outside the U.S. … Copenhagen, Hamburg and Kings Cross in London are held up as good examples. …
[M]illennials are more collaborative … and want to create a new narrative from what they see at the national level.” “The Untold Good News Story of
America Today,” BBC News, June 18, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-44349211.
89 Philip Bobbitt, “The Decay and Renewal of the American Constitutional Order,” in Nation, State and Empire (Engelsberg Seminar, 2017).
90 Bruce Katz and Jeremy Nowak, The New Localism: How Cities Can Thrive in the Age of Populism (Brookings Institution Press, 2018).
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atom undergoes nuclear fission, a few neutrons
are ejected from the reaction. These free neutrons
then react with other isotopes, like uranium 235,
and cause more fissions. This is the phenomenon
known as a chain reaction. This “fissioning” is what
is happening, at a varying but often accelerating
pace, within the political society of the United
States.
In 2004, the writer Bill Bishop described a
development he called “the Big Sort,”91 which traced
the self-segregation of Americans into like-minded,
evermore ideologically polarized communities. At
the regional level, the sorting has been distinctly
bicoastal, with New England, the mid-Atlantic,
and Pacific regions growing more Democratic,
while the West, Texas, and the South grew more
Republican. At the same time, America’s coastal
cities are becoming better educated, wealthier,
and more cohesive while much of the center of the
country is hollowing out. In most states, this trend
has picked up momentum in the last 25 years. Just
three states had less political polarization in 2012
than in 1992.92 Like-minded people are clustering
together, and clustering together seems to make
people even more like-minded. Data from the
2016 presidential election show that this sorting
is actually increasing: Although the Democratic
candidate decisively won the popular vote, she
carried only 487 of the 3,141 counties.93 Four years
before, Barack Obama won 689.94 In 20 years, onehalf the population will live in eight states; the 16
most populous states will have about 70 percent of
the population. This means that 34 states will have
about 30 percent of America’s people.
This raises concerns that the people in twothirds of the states (34) — the number required
to call a constitutional convention or propose
constitutional amendments — could amount to
far less than two-thirds of the population and,
similarly, that the population of three-quarters of
the states — 38 states — could ratify the results
even though they contain far less than threequarters of the population.
Whatever the formal consequences of this
demographic and political sorting, there is a real
threat to America’s common tradition when states
that have become overwhelmingly representative

of particular minorities — and I include white
Anglo-Saxon Protestants — achieve overwhelming
political power in the various states. For one
thing, this could bring about a reversal of the
constitutional dynamic of the last century and a
half by which human rights were made uniform
across all the states. Right now, a shoplifter or a
bank robber arrested in Wyoming is read the same
Miranda rights as one arrested in Florida. The same
standards are applied banning prayer in schools,
or forbidding the criminalization of abortion, or
prohibiting the use of narcotics. This could change.
Already, some states practice capital punishment
while others do not — even though in most foreign
states there is a uniform rule with respect to this
question. In some instances, this fissioning of
the national project might encourage welcome
reform — I am thinking of the decriminalization of
certain drug use. But there is also deadly risk to the
American constitutional project in such marketdriven variation, which treats the citizen more like
a consumer than a member of the national polity.
For example, I need hardly observe that racializing
discourse would add an accelerant to this fissioning
that could prove fatal to the American project.

V. Overcoming
Reflecting on the effort to create a world order
after World War II, Dean Acheson wrote that
his task was “just a bit less formidable than that
described in the first chapter of Genesis. That was
to create a world out of chaos; ours, to create half a
world, a free half, out of the same material without
blowing the whole [thing up] in the process.”95
Acheson’s hope was to craft political and
economic arrangements that would bind the anticommunist world through the benefits conferred
by free trade, stable currencies, and the example
of liberal democracies that flourished in the
atmosphere of tolerance and open debate. Since
the end of World War II, this world order has
achieved more, perhaps, than Acheson could have
hoped for. The United States has contributed
money and ideas to expand trade, fight disease,
encourage the development of new technologies,

91 Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (Wilmington, MA: Mariner Books, 2008).
92 Ron Johnston, David Manley, and Kelvyn Jones, “Spatial Polarization of Presidential Voting in the United States, 1992–2012,”
Annals of the American Association of Geographers 106, no. 5 (2016): 1047, https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2016.1191991.
93 “Thanks to a Bad Map and Bizarre Math, Breitbart Can Report That Trump Won the REAL Popular Vote,” Washington Post, Nov. 15, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/15/thanks-to-a-bad-map-and-bizarre-math-breitbart-can-report-that-trump-won-thereal-popular-vote/.
94 “Obama Won a Record-Low Share of U.S. Counties — But He Won Them Big,” NBC News, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/50073771/t/obama-won-record-low-share-us-counties-he-won-them-big/.
95 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), “Apologia Pro Libre Hoc” (1987).
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and increase the scope and lower the cost of global
transport. Most importantly, America has risked its
own safety to guarantee the safety of other states.
It was American leadership of that world order
that ended the Cold War, that reversed the Iraqi
annexation of Kuwait, that finally halted the ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans, and that brought peace
between Israel and Egypt.
It is hardly implausible to say that had the
American state not developed as it has, the world
would be poorer, less free, and, above all, less
hopeful.
America can vindicate its role in defending the
world order if it can maintain confidence in its
constitutional and strategic values. Those values
reflect the American assumptions that alliances
are a strategic asset (America’s first foray into
world affairs was the Monroe Doctrine, guaranteed
by the British Royal Navy96); that public policy
abroad, like policy at home, must reflect America’s
values, because the assertion of U.S. interests is
the assertion of U.S. values; that security, wealth,
and freedom flourish in environments that aim to
nurture them and therefore are not the result of
a mercantile competition that assumes that one
person’s gain is another’s loss. America will succeed
because constitutional innovation and free markets
and ingenious technology are endeavors America is
good at. But if America betrays its constitutional

ethos — what makes it exceptional but cannot by
itself make it exceptionally virtuous or good — it
will lose confidence and won’t even try.
The weakest link in U.S. national strategy is a
growing lack of confidence in America’s institutions,
its heritage, and its goals. When America has
succeeded as a country, it is because it has relied
on a sense of purpose and a shared belief that it
can and will do the right thing because — not in
every case and every time — it has subscribed to

the ideals of the American constitutional ethos,
and it has taken pains to convince others that it
would act in accordance with that ethos. Without
this sense of past achievements and of struggles
overcome, America will necessarily fail, because it
will have defeated itself. Other states, motivated
by different principles, will take up this role. As
William Burns, former deputy secretary of state,
put it, “We can shape things or wait to get shaped
by China and everybody else.”97 Indeed, one can
already see in the backlash that triumphed in the
2016 presidential election, the disabling of those
steps — like the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade
agreement — that would have been positive steps
in countering the de-stabilizing rise of China.
•

•

•

The rise of populist movements in the West, the
rise of China in the East, and the growth of social
media all have converged to undermine America’s
commitment to democratic republics, which are
the structural form of the U.S. constitutional ethos,
an ethos of liberal values that the United States has
championed in the international system.
The rise of these movements is widely taken
to be an implicit criticism of that system. As
has been observed earlier in this paper, it is an
illiberal reaction to the unresponsiveness of the
democratic political process. This reaction is
supercharged by the growth of social media that
bypasses the traditional processes of party politics
and representative government. Perhaps equally
important, social media platforms also bypass the
intellectual gatekeepers of the mainstream media,
upon which Americans have relied for a factual
consensus to ground political debate. Champions
of this development claim to be disenchanted
with the corruption of the republican structure
of representation. Thus, both populism and its
developmental companion, social media, are fueled
by disgust.
As Jack Balkin has put it, populists are angry
about the democratic shortfall of government,98 and
social media reflects anger about the unrepublican
shortcomings of representation. The evidence,
however, might be characterized differently.
One might say that only a few political scientists
care about democracy per se — or republicanism
for that matter — and, while they obsess about

96 See Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011).
97 Dexter Filkins, “Rex Tillerson at the Breaking Point,” New Yorker, Oct. 16, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/16/rextillerson-at-the-breaking-point.
98 Jack M. Balkin, “Constitutional Rot” in Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America, ed. Cass R. Sunstein (New York: Dey Street Books,
2018). Also published by Yale Law School as Public Law Research Paper no. 604, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992961.
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the unrepresentative nature of the Senate and
the loss of civic virtue in politicians, the public
is not similarly preoccupied. Rather, what
motivates contemporary populists and social
media movements are the expectations that their
members should be treated like customers and
consumers rather than citizens, and thus that
they bear no responsibility for reforming the
system through their own participation, other
than simply going on to another carrier or vendor
to satisfy their needs.
This attitude, reflected in various surveys,
is especially worrying among the young.99 Not
only is there an illiberal “cohort shift,” with
young citizens today being more skeptical about
democracy than their parents were at the same
age, but Millennials are also more likely to
denigrate democratic institutions and to express
a preference for a shift — to the right in some
places, to the left in others — away from their
liberal democratic heritage.
In such a situation, the legitimacy of the State
is put into play. It is a commonplace to say that
the governments of the West are dysfunctional,
but are there agreed-upon ends they are not
functioning to achieve? A debate between Sanford
Levinson and Balkin on this subject quickly
revealed that “dysfunctional” was largely a label
for “unable to pass the legislation I favor and
that, I concede, is widely opposed.”100
The admiration and confidence accorded the
governing operating systems of the democratic
republics are waning, but it is not their
functionality as operating systems so much as
their legitimacy — the relationship of the State
to the People — that is responsible for this. The
industrial nation-state is increasingly unable to
make the claim that it will improve the material
well-being of its people, and this claim has been
the basis of the legitimacy of this constitutional
order for more than a century. In fact, with
regard to the spread of nuclear and chemical
weapons; the growth of global terror networks,
international criminal conspiracies, and hacking
threats; the frequency and virulence of epidemics;
climate change; the fragility of national financial
institutions; the protection of national morals
and culture; and the use of law to enforce moral

codes, the State seems increasingly to be at a loss.
This is why the rise of China is salient for the
constitutional order of democratic republics.
China provides an alternative, undemocratic,
unrepublican form of government that does seem
to be able to affirm its basis for legitimacy. The
Chinese regime appears capable of increasing
the total wealth of society steadily, consistently,
even dramatically, while increasing the economic
opportunities available to its people. As such, it is a
harbinger of the new constitutional order of states
that tends to treat its citizens as consumers.101
Globally, Millennials are much more positive
about President Xi Jinping and his ability to
invest in the future, and they appear less troubled
by his repression of political opposition and
debate.102 China’s rise in the international order is
directly proportional to its success domestically,
a success that depends upon jettisoning the basis
for legitimacy that undergirds the other great
states of the world.
By contrast, in the United States the increase
in racial antagonism and alienation, increasing
income inequality and hostility to leading elites,
considerable illegal immigration and the largest
levels of legal immigration since 1890, and the
executive’s increasing reliance on discretionary
law enforcement all testify to an unraveling of
the compact that forms the basis of democratic
republics, the triumphant variant of the
constitutional order of industrial nation-states.
Calling this “dysfunction” is a misnomer. It is
instead the transition from one constitutional
order to another.
One
dreadful
consequence
of
these
developments is the growing, concomitant hatred
of various groups within society. The white
supremacists at Charlottesville are indeed more
vile than the antifa mob at Berkeley, because racial
and religious prejudice is uniquely odious, but
both are marinated in hatred for the other. The
threat to the rest of society arises, as Machiavelli
observed, from the fact that tyranny comes to
power by promising to crush the elements that
the people hate.
So what is to be done? The first step is to
recognize that what is happening in the United
States is happening everywhere and that it is a

99 See Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 5, https://www.
journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect.
100 Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, “Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange,” Indiana Law Review 50 (posted online Aug. 8, 2016). Also
published by Yale Law School as Public Law Research Paper no. 579, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820202.
101 Charles Rollet, “The Odd Reality of Life Under China’s All-Seeing Credit Score System,” Wired, June 5, 2018, https://www.wired.co.uk/
article/china-social- credit.
102 Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, and Hani Zainulbhai, “China and the Global Balance of Power,” Pew Research Center, June 29, 2016, http://
www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/29/3-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/.
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fundamental, not a transient, development. That
development is the challenge to the current
constitutional order of the United States and other
dominant states by a new form of the State.103
Absent this recognition, America is condemned
to dealing with its problems piecemeal and
ineffectively. But armed with this awareness,
America can instead craft its own version of the
coming constitutional order, just as it did with its
predecessor within which we now live.
Second, America must recognize those common
threats that beset the world order: climate change,
networked terror, an increasingly febrile and
fragile international financial system, and the
proliferation of technologies of mass destruction
that could lead to the use of nuclear and biological
weapons. Failure to deal with all of these matters
is destroying the legitimacy of the industrial
nation-state. Third, the United States must use
those techniques it is best at: assimilation and
tolerance against terror; the ingenuity of markets
and innovative technology to manage climate
change and global financial connectedness;
deterrence and — if necessary — intervention by
an alliance against the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. America knows that it knows
how to do these things because it has done them
successfully in the past.
If it is true that the international order is shaped
by the most successful and dynamic constitutional
order, then America must look to its domestic
polity to begin these initiatives. As much as such
efforts may cause unease, America must find a
way to bring together the concerns of protesting
students, grieving and outraged African-Americans
who are victims of state violence, marginalized
sexual groups of varying self-identification,
working-class persons frustrated by apparently
unstoppable immigration and evaporating
economic opportunity, families discouraged by
the coarsening of American life, and religious
communities that feel themselves at war with the
larger culture, along with the currently dispirited
liberal advocates of tolerance, dispassion, and
debate. That will mean inventing a constitutional
order based on the traditional values of America’s
democratic republic and legitimating its structure
through an equal responsiveness to the concerns

of those currently alienated from that structure
and to those who are alienated from the apparent
shifts in that structure. In this task, the sheer
bloody-mindedness of the current administration
may be a solvent, dissipating the hardening molds
of distrust and making possible a new era of faith
in the American enterprise. As a start, the United
States should consider some regime of reparations
for African-Americans — who regardless of their
relationship to the practice of racial slavery still
labor under its legacy — and Native Americans
whose treaties with the United States remain to
be honored. It is not simply a matter of obligation
to these groups so much as it is a matter of selfrespect. The way to redress foreign wrongs is
to recover American self-confidence so that the
United States can lead the international order to
a prosperity and security that embraces all states
that wish to participate in that order.
Although it has been routinely misinterpreted
by American politicians — or perhaps because it
has been so misinterpreted — I want to close with
a reflection on John Winthrop’s famous speech
charting a vision for the American colonists in
1630. He said to the passengers of the Arbella, “We
shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people
are upon us.”104
By this Winthrop emphatically did not mean
that the excellence of America’s example would
be the marvel of the age or that the virtue of
the immigrants he addressed would make their
enterprise a success. On the contrary, he knew
that Europeans expected this experiment to fail.
This is what Winthrop meant when he warned
that “the eyes of all people are upon us.” His words
were a caution to the new Americans to behave
themselves, to take up their grave responsibilities
and face their equally grave challenges with a
decent respect for the opinions of mankind.
An elected legislature was established. Ministers
were prohibited from holding political office.
Harvard College was founded six years later.105 All
this was done without a formal charter from the
British government.
No one can say where the American experiment
is headed. Its strife and failures have also been
a part, perhaps an indispensable part, of its
triumphs. Its legacy — the American constitutional

103 For a discussion of market-states in the context of contemporary international politics, see Philip Bobbitt, “States of Disorder,” New
Statesman, March 1, 2016, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/03/states-disorder. As constitutional orders are differentiated by
their claims to legitimacy, one way to understand the industrial nation-state and its competitor the informational market-state is to specify their
respective bases for legitimacy. Very roughly, the nation-states say, “Give us power and we will improve your well-being by using law to tame
the operations of the market,” while market-states say, “Give us power and we will maximize your opportunities by using the market to make the
society richer and more spacious.”
104 Winthrop’s speech can be read at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3918.
105 Harvard College was founded in 1636: https://college.harvard.edu/about/mission-and-vision.
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ethos — has redeemed its history. Now that ethos
must create history anew.

Conclusion
In this essay I have argued that what makes the
United States exceptional is also what makes it
indispensable going forward as the states of the
world adapt a new constitutional order to cope with
the challenges that are overwhelming the industrial
nation-state. The alternative is not a return to the
halcyon days of national identity secured by laws
that privileged a dominant ethnic or national
group’s values in the governance of the State, not
because these laws were morally wrong, though
in some places and at some times they certainly
were by the contemporary standards of today (for
what other moral standards can we authentically
apply?), but because such constitutional regimes
cannot manage the challenges of the 21st century.
The alternative is an illiberalism of both the left
and the right that will infect the emerging marketstates of the world just as fascism and communism
infected the industrial nation-states of the last
century.
American exceptionalism does not make the
United States uniquely virtuous or especially
virtuous, for that matter; it merely makes the
American state capable of adaptation according to
rules that rely on the conscience.
The constitutional challenges that currently
beset states are responsible for the various,
seemingly contradictory, crises that are occurring
globally; these challenges can be resolved favorably
to the values of the liberal tradition that ground the
American constitutional ethos. Only a recognition
of that ethos and its reinvigoration will enable the
United States to play a positive role in leading the
world to that resolution.
Acknowledgements: I should like to thank two
remarkable research assistants, Andrew Elliott and
Philippe Schiff, for their outstanding efforts on this
essay; and I would also like to thank Megan Oprea,
Autumn Brewington, and Ryan Evans for their
editorial assistance at the Texas National Security
Review. Of course, any errors of fact or judgment
that remain, despite their help, are mine alone.
Philip Bobbitt is Herbert Wechsler Professor of
Federal Jurisprudence and Director of the Center
on National Security, Columbia Law School and
Distinguished Senior Lecturer at the University
of Texas.

78

